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Iraqi Crimes and International Law: The
Imperative to Punish
Louis REN9 BERES*
The United States now has a new president. If he should take his
Constitutional obligations seriously, both the obligations of international
and U.S. law, President Clinton will take the necessary steps to ensure
prosecution of Iraqi crimes committed before, during, and after the recent
Gulf War. The following essay examines these necessary steps against the
background of the Nuremburg prosecutions and the associated concept of
nullum crimen sine poena, no crime without a punishment.
In his opening statement at Nuremberg on November 21, 1945, Chief
U.S. Prosecutor Justice Robert H. Jackson asked rhetorically: "Did we
spend American lives to capture [twenty Nazi defendants] only to save
them from punishment?" 1 Thus jurisprudentially dramatizing the imper-
ative to prosecute wrongs he describes as calculated, malignant, and dev-
astating.' It also highlighted the irony of other options wherein American
custody would effectively shelter war criminals. Today while still lacking
custody over Iraqi perpetrators of Nuremberg category crimes, Americans
should raise the same question about the 1991 Gulf War. Realizing the
answer, this question could move us, as a nation, to give effect to the
principle nullum crimen sine poena (no crime without a punishment).8
Recognizing the right of belligerents to punish as war criminals those
who violate the laws or customs of war, Allied forces declared on Novem-
ber 1, 1943, that "atrocities, massacres and cold blooded mass executions
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1. RICHARD A. FALK, ET. AL., CRIMES OF WAR: A LEGAL, POLITICAL-DOCUMENTARY AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF LEADERS, CITIZENS AND SOLDIERS FOR
CRIMINAL ACTS IN WARS 81 (1971); See also Benjamin B. Ferencz, 1 Defining International
Aggression: The Search for World Peace 437 (1975).
2. See FALK et. al., supra note 1, at 107. This imperative was reaffirmed in Principle I
of The Nuremberg Principles (1946): "Any person who commits an act which constitutes a
crime under international law is responsible therefore and liable to punishment." The Nu-
remberg Principles were later formulated by the International Law Commission, at the re-
quest of the General Assembly, in June-July 1950. Article 1: "Offenses against the peace and
security of mankind, as defined in this code, are crimes under international law, for which
the responsible individuals shall be punished." Draft Code Of Offenses Against The Peace
And Security Of Mankind, GAOR Supp., No. 9 (A/2693).
3. Punishment is, quite plausibly, the original meaning of justice, and is assuredly one
of its most essential components. For a comprehensive consideration of these concepts, and
their interdependence, see ROBERT C. SOLOMON AND MARK C. MURPHY, WHAT IS JUSTICE?
CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS (1990); see generally Haim H. Cohn, On the Immo-
rality of Punishment, 25 ISRAEL L. REV., No. 3-4, 284-291 (1991).
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which were being perpetrated by the Hitlerite forces..." should be the
object of criminal prosecution and punishment.4 With this Moscow Decla-
ration, the three allied powers, the United States, the United Kingdom
and the Soviet Union, announced that the 'minor' Nazi war criminals
would be tried and punished by the courts of the lands where the crimes
took place. As for the major criminals "whose offenses had no particular
geographical location, '" punishment was to be the product of joint Allied
judgment.
Between October 1943 and January 1944, the U.S. and the U.K. es-
tablished a United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War
Crimes, commonly known as the United Nations War Crimes Commission
(UNWCC). The commission, meeting in London during 1944, compiled
lists of war criminals. On August 8, 1945, the London Agreement and its
accompanying Charter6 provided the constitutional authority for an In-
ternational Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The law embodied in this
Charter was "decisive and binding upon the Tribunal"' and provided that
"the Tribunal . . . shall have the power to try and punish persons who,
acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as individ-
uals or as member of organizations, committed any of the following
crimes: (a) crimes against peace; (b) war crimes; (c) crimes against
humanity."8
The results of the Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals are
now well-known. Among other things, the Tribunal explicitly rejected the
idea that states are the only subjects of international law and declared
authoritatively that individuals are punishable for crimes against interna-
tional law.' As a practical matter, Germany had surrendered uncondition-
ally, and the allies did not encounter any legal problems in gaining cus-
tody over the major Nazi criminals. How comparable, then, is
Nuremberg" to the current situation concerning Iraqi crimes?1 1 Primarily
4. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Law and the Holocaust, 9 CAL W. INT'L L. J.
208 n.2 (1979), citing Moscow Declaration, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 7 (Supp. 1944).
5. Bassiouni, supra note 4.
6. London Agreement of Aug. 8, 1945, with accompanying Charter, E.A.S. No. 472, 82
U.N.T.S. 284.
7. See 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL AT NUREMBURG, Judgment 218 (1947).
8. Supra note 6, art. 61. Crimes of war, crimes against peace and crimes against hu-
manity are defined in the Charter at Article 6 (a), (b), (c).
9. According to the Judgment, "Crimes against international law are committed by
men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes
can the provisions of international law be enforced." Supra note 7, at 223.
10. See Persian Gulf: The Question of War Crimes, Hearings Before the Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 102d Congress, 1st Sess., 17-20 (1991). (statement of Anthony D'Amato
on the applicability of the Nuremberg precedent to Gulf War Iraqi crimes) [hereinafter
D'Amatol. In this connection, Professor D'Amato stressed the "educational impact" of trials
of Iraqi war criminals:
The enormity of the crimes committed by various Iraqi leaders in the Persian
Gulf War is a lesson that has to be brought home to the world day after day
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because Iraq, unlike Germany, emerged from war unoccupied, it is im-
probable that a Nuremberg style tribunal could be convened within Iraq
or that custody over Iraqi criminals could be gained without resort to
forcible abductions. Nevertheless, the Principles of Nuremberg, formu-
lated by the International Law Commission (ILC) and adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly in 1950, bind all member states and
should compel timely prosecution of Iraqi crimes against peace,12 war
crimes'" and crimes against humanity.
What crimes were committed in the Gulf War? 14 Persistent and well-
documented reports indicate truly horrendous crimes,' crimes so terrible
and week after week as the trial proceeds in it slowly deliberate way. A war
crimes trial should not be today's news forgotten tomorrow. Rather, it should
be one of the most fundamental lessons in civics that can be taught to the
people of the world, especially young people. The lesson is that there is noth-
ing glamorous about wars of aggression; that the people who wage such wars
are the lowest form of criminals; and that they will be brought to justice just as
common criminals are brought to justice in the courts of all civilized nations.
See also, William V. O'Brien, The Nuremberg Precedent and the Gulf War, 31 VA. J. INT'L
L. 391-401 (1991). (Confirming view of the applicability of the Nuremberg precedent).
11. For a comprehensive consideration of Iraqi war crimes and prosecutorial options,
see generally Jordan J. Paust, Suing Saddam: Private Remedies for War Crimes and Hos-
tage-Taking, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 351-380 (1991); Louis Ren6 Beres, The United States
Should Take the Lead in Preparing International Legal Machinery for Prosecution of
Iraqi Crimes, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 381-390 (1991); William V. O'Brien, supra note 10, at 391-
402; and John Norton Moore, War Crimes and the Rule of Law in the Gulf Crisis, 31 VA. J.
INT'L L. 403-415 (1991).
12. Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 206. Cherif Bassiouni reports that "the first prosecution
for initiating an unjust war is reported to have been in Naples, in 1268, when Conradin von
Hohenstafen was put to death for that reason. See also, Remigiusz Bierzanek, War Crimes:
History and Definition, in 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 559, 560 (M.
Cherif Bassiouni & Ved P. Nanda eds., 1973).
13. Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 206. Bassiouni also reports that the first international
prosecution for war crimes was the prosecution of one Peter von Hagenbach in Breisach,
Germany, in 1474 before a tribunal of twenty-eight judges from the allied states of the Holy
Roman Empire. See also William H. Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 61
MIL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1973).
14. For documentation of Iraqi crimes, see Amnesty International News Release, "Iraqi
Forces Killings (sic) and Torturing in Kuwait, Says Amnesty International Fact-Finding
Team," Al Index: MDE 14/15/90. Distr. SC/PO (Oct. 3, 1990) (a preliminary report on wide-
spread charges of Iraqi torture, willful killing, rape, pillage and collective reprisals); Am-
nesty International Report, "Iraq Occupied Kuwait Human Rights Violations Since 2 Au-
gust," AI Index MDE 14/16/90. Distr. SC/CO/GR (Dec. 19, 1990). For personal testimonies
of.Iraqi brutalities, see Letter from Kuwait, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1991, at A17; and Shafeeq
Ghabra, The Iraqi Occupation of Kuwait: An Eyewitness Account, 20 J. OF PALESTINE
STUDIES 78, 112-125 n.2. For further documentation, see Crisis in the Persian Gulf: Sanc-
tions, Diplomacy and War, Hearings Before the House Comm. on Armed Services, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. 920 (1991); Human Rights Abuses in Kuwait and Iraq, Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 192 (1991); The Persian Gulf Cri-
sis, Joint Hearings Before the Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and
Science, Europe and the Middle East, and on International Operations, Committee on
Foreign Affairs and the Joint Economic Committee, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 576 (1990).
15. Any indictments setting forth criminal charges against Saddam Hussein and other
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that they mandate universal cooperation in apprehension and punish-
ment. These crimes, what lawyers call crimen contra omnes, crimes
against all, concern (1) barbarous and inhuman assaults against Kuwaitis
and other nationals in Kuwait; (2) barbarous and inhuman treatment of
coalition prisoners of war in Iraq and Kuwait; and (3) aggression and
crimes of war against noncombatant populations in Israel and Saudi Ara-
bia.16 All of these grave breaches of international law are in addition to
the original crime against peace17 committed against Kuwait on August 2,
1990.'" The United States and all other states bound by the 1949 Geneva
unnamed defendants must identify violations, inter alia, of the following three authoritative
codifications: Convention Against Torture And Other Cruel, Inhumane Or Degrading
Treatment Or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 93d plen. mtg., Annex,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/72 (1984); International Convention Against the Taking of Hos-
tages, G.A. Res. 34/146, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 105th plen. mtg., Annex, Supp. No. 39,
U.N. Doc. A/34/39 (1979); and Resolution on Disappeared Persons, G.A. Res. 33/173, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Comm., 90th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/33/509 (1978).
16. We must also add here Iraq's commission of new forms of environmental destruc-
tion and environmental manipulation as a form of warfare. The intentional dumping of mil-
lions of barrels of Kuwaiti and Saudi oil into the Gulf and the torching of Kuwaiti oil wells
represent clear and egregious violations of Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Ge-
neva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3553, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. See
also International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May 29,
1961, 12 U.S.T. 2989, 327 U.N.T.S. 3, (regarding Saddam Hussein's "Eco-Terrorism" against
Kuwaiti oil wells).
17. Pursuant to the London Agreement of August 8, 1945, the indictment of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal contained two counts concerning crimes against peace and was
founded on the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Stimson Note of 1932, the Geneva Protocol and
the Resolutions of the Eighth Assembly of the League of Nations and the Sixth Interna-
tional Conference of American states. Moreover, the Weimar Constitution had stated that
"generally accepted rules of international law" were part of German law and that the out-
lawry of aggressive war had been one of the "generally accepted rules of international law"
in 1939. IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FoRcE BY STATES (1963).
18. For crimes against peace, or waging aggressive war, see Resolution on the Definition
of Aggression, Dec. 14, 1974, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR 142, Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974). For pertinent codifications of the criminalization of aggression, see also: The
1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact (Pact of Paris); Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as
an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 U.N.T.S. 57;
U.N. Charter Article 2; Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T. S.
No. 993, 1976 U.N.Y.B. 1043 (entered into force, Oct. 24, 1945); The 1965 Declaration on
the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of
Their. Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR 11, Supp. No. 14,
U.N. Doc. A/6014, (1966); The 1970 U.N. General Assembly Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in ac-
cordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR 121,
Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971); The 1972 Declaration on the Non-use of Force in
International Relations and Permanent Prohibition on the Use of Nuclear Weapons, G.A.
Res. 2936, 27 U.N. GAOR 5, Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972); The Charter of the
International Military Tribunal, annex to the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punish-
ment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544,
E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; and Resolution Affirming the Principles of International
Law Recognized by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95, 1 U.N. GAOR
1144, U.N. Doc. A/236 (1946). See also The Convention on the Rights and Duties of States,
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Conventions are obligated under international law to search out and pros-
ecute, or extradite, individuals alleged to have committed grave breaches
of these Conventions. According to Article 146 of the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention (Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War):
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search
for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be com-
mitted, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless
of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers,
and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such
persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned,
provided such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie
case. 9
Between August 2, 1990, the date of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and
October 29, 1990, the Security Council adopted ten resolutions explicitly
condemning the Baghdad regime for multiple crimes of the gravest possi-
ble nature.20 These crimen contra omnes crimes, which are so terrible
that they mandate universal enforcement, jurisdiction and responsibility,
cry out for legal prosecution even absent authorizing resolutions by the
UN Security Council. This is because the prohibition of the now docu-
mented barbarous activities of Iraq falls under a "peremptory" rule of
international law, which is an absolutely binding rule allowing no form of
derogation whatsoever.2 '
Dec. 26, 1933, arts. 8, 10-11, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (known generally
as the "Montevideo Convention"); The Pact of the League of Arab States, March 22, 1945,
art. 5, 70 U.N.T.S. 237; Charter of the Organization of American States, April 30, 1948, chs.
II, IV, V, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 and Protocol of Amendment, Feb.
27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847 (known generally as the "Protocol of Buenos
Aires"); The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, Sept. 2, 1947, 62 Stat. 1681.,
T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 121 U.N.T.S. 77 (known generally as the "Rio Pact"); The American
Treaty on Pacific Settlement, April 30, 1948, 30 U.N.T.S. 55 (known generally as the "Pact
of Bogota"); and the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, arts. II,
III, 479 U.N.T.S. 39.
19. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 16, at art. 146, 6 U.S.T at 3365.
20. For a comprehensive compilation of authoritative documents pertaining to the Gulf
War, see Current Documents: Gulf War Legal and Diplomatic Documents, 13 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 281.
21. According to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, "a peremptory norm of general
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modi-
fied only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character."
Even a treaty that might seek to criminalize forms of insurgency protected by this peremp-
tory norm would be invalid. Further, "[a] treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it
conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law." The concept is extended to
newly emerging peremptory norms by Article 64 of the Convention: "If a new peremptory
norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in conflict with that
norm becomes void and terminates." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 22,
1969, art. 53, U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, First and Second Sessions, Mar. 26-
May 24, 1968, and Apr. 9-May 22, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, at 289 (1969), reprinted
in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
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Time is running out! Saddam Hussein and the surviving members of
his Revolutionary Council, by evading prosecution, would defile justice
and leave international law weak and tragically undermined, whatever the
military outcome.
Significantly, the Security Council issued its resolutions before the
most serious Iraqi crimes were uncovered. What does this imply? Our
current system of international law2 2 establishes, beyond any reasonable
doubt, the primacy of justice and human rights in world affairs. The
words used so carefully at Nuremberg, "so far from it being unjust to
punish him, it would be unjust if his wrongs were allowed to go unpun-
ished,"23 derive from the very ancient principle: nullum crimen sine
poena. This principle applies with particular clarity and urgency to the
crimes of Saddam Hussein and his henchmen.
It is arguable, of course, that the formal protocol of a trial would
prove manifestly unjust applied to such overwhelming lawlessness. The
concept here is that prosecution of Iraqi crimes under international law
would result in a mockery of civilized law-enforcement, not because of
perceived abuses of power and legal procedure but because such judicial
"remedy" could create an erroneous appearance of proportionality. This
argument, which holds that for certain egregious crimes, no amount of
punishment can produce justice, leads to two diametrically opposite
courses of action: (1) extra-judicial punishment (normally execution), or
(2) leaving the crimes unpunished altogether. The first course of action is
unsatisfactory. It contains all of the elements of infinite regress. When, if
ever, is the amount of extra-judicial punishment finally commensurate
with the crime? There are also tactical difficulties involved in killing an
"adequate" number of perpetrators. Moreover, this option is plagued by
an inadequacy concerning the identification of the wrongdoers, probable
cause and the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.24 The second
22. International law, of course, is part of U.S. law. Recalling the words used by the
U.S. Supreme Court in The Paquete Habana, the principal case concerning the incorpora-
tion of international law into this country's municipal law
[I]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and adminis-
tered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions
of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this
purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act
or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized
nations.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
23. Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremburg Tribu-
nal and in the Judgement of the Tribunal, U.N. Doc. A/8771.
24. The "beyond reasonable doubt" standard, that has characterized the Anglo-Ameri-
can criminal justice system for more than two hundred years, is a component of the broader
question of the theory of evidence. Evidentiary doctrines are associated with arrest, pretrial
examination, and grand jury indictment. Historically, the study of reasonable doubt has
been linked to the work of juries. English law was affected by John Locke who presented an
ordered account of levels of probability. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDER-
STANDING (1690). Locke's criteria for evaluating testimony emphasized the number of wit-
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course of action is unsatisfactory because it represents flagrant disregard
for expectations of nulum crimen sine poena.
The Nuremberg obligations to bring major Iraqi criminals to trial are
doubly binding to the U.S. as these obligations represent not only current
obligations under international law,"5 but also the higher obligations
found in the American political tradition.2" By their codification of the
nesses, their integrity, their skill at presenting evidence and its agreement with the circum-
stances and the presence or absence of contrary testimony. Samuel Pufendorf links the
concept of "conscience" to notions of moral certainty and beyond reasonable doubt. For
Pufendorf, the "satisfied conscience" of a jury required rational, unbiased and unemotional
acts of the understanding. SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS (C. H.
Oldfather & W..A. Oldfather trans., 1688). Regarding the concept of "probable cause," it is
now the prevailing grand jury evidentiary standard. In the United States, probable cause
has usually not been used as a standard to determine the guilt or innocence of accused
defendants, but rather to determine whether or not sufficient evidence has been produced to
indicate that a crime has been committed by the accused. BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT AND PROBABLE CAUSE 103 (1991). The concept has also been important
in the context of arrest and search standards. This is quite different from our concern with
extra-judicial punishment. One partial "remedy" in assassination decisions would be to re-
place the standard of probable cause with the stricter prima facia case standard. For the
origins of this standard, see THOMAS STARKIE, 1 PRACTICAL TREATISE OF THE LAW OF EvI-
DENCE 554 (10th ed., 1876). A coherent and purposeful elucidation of the prima facie evi-
dence standard was offered by Chief Justice Shaw's 1832 charge to a Massachusetts grand
jury that prima facie evidence of guilt ". . . be of such a nature, that if it stood alone,
uncontradicted and uncontrolled by any defensive matter, it would be sufficient to justify a
conviction on trial." SHAPIRO, at 95. As evidentiary standards, prima facie and probable
cause suggest different degrees of probability, with probable cause as a less demanding stan-
dard. Significantly, there is an important connection between the prima facie case standard
and legally admissible/competent evidence, i.e., what grand juries would consider trial-ad-
missible evidence. An advantage of a prima facie case standard in deciding upon extra-judi-
cial punishment is that it demands decisional authorities not to inflict harm on an accused
unless it can fairly predict that the accused would be found guilty by a jury. Needless to say,
this advantage is complicated and undermined by the fact that (a) fair prediction is an
exceedingly complicated calculation; and (b) the jury in question would have been convened
in the municipal context of the assassinating state's court. All of this is complicated further
by the designated victim's incapacity to confront his accusers, what would certainly seem to
be in basic violation of elementary "due process" standards. Moreover, it may be especially
difficult to apply probability calculations in extrajudicial settings, i.e., more difficult than in
constituted legal arenas.
25. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the Charter of the
Nuremburg Tribunal (1946) was followed by Resolution 177, adopted November 21, 1947,
directing the U.N. International Law Commission to "(a) formulate the principles of inter-
national law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the judgment of
the Tribunal and (b) prepare a draft code of offenses against the peace and security of
mankind .. " H.R.J. Res. 177, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), U.N. Doc. A/519, at 112. For
the principles formulated, see RICHARD A. FALK, supra note 1, at 107-108.
26. The principle of a higher law is one of the enduring and canonic principles in the
history of the United States. Codified in both the Declaration of Independence and in the
Constitution, it rests upon the acceptance of certain notions of right and justice that obtain
because of their own obvious merit. Such notions, as the celebrated Blackstone declared, are
nothing less than "the eternal, immutable laws of good and evil, to which the Creator him-
self in all his dispensations conforms; and which he has enabled human reason to discover so
far as they are necessary for the conduct of human actions." When Jefferson set to work to
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principle that basic human rights, in war and in peace, are now peremp-
tory, the Nuremberg obligations reflect perfect convergence of interna-
tional law and the enduring foundation of our American Republic."
Worldwide lack of concern for legal protection of human rights grew
out of the post-Westphalian system of world politics. This system sancti-
fies untrammeled competition between sovereign States and identifies na-
tional loyalty as the overriding human obligation. With these develop-
ments, unfettered nationalism and State-centrism have become dominant
characteristics of international relations. The resultant world order has
come to subordinate all moral and ethical sensibilities to the idea of un-
limited sovereignty. Such subordination was more than a little ironic.
Even Jean Bodin, who advanced the idea of sovereignty as free of any
external control or internal division, recognized the limits imposed by di-
vine law and natural law.
It is equally ironic that former President Bush, reacting to the news
of post-war Iraqi crimes against the Kurds and other minorities, 28 spoke
of Iraqi "sovereignty" in ways that placed such crimes within the ambit
of domestic jurisdiction. All such crimes become matters of international
concern because of their international impact and the outrage they invoke
draft the Declaration he drew freely upon Aristotle, Cicero, Grotius, Vattel, Pufendorf,
Burlamaqui, and Locke's Second Treatise of Government. Asserting the right of revolution
whenever government becomes destructive of "certain unalienable rights," the Declaration
of Independence posits a natural order in the world whose laws are external to all human
will and which are discoverable through human reason. Although, by the eighteenth century,
God had withdrawn from immediate contact with humankind and had been transformed
into Final Cause or Prime Mover of the universe, "nature" provided an appropriate substi-
tute. Reflecting the decisive influence of Isaac Newton, whose Principia was first published
in 1686, all of creation could now be taken as an expression of divine will. Hence, the only
way to know God's will was to discover the law of nature; Locke and Jefferson had defied
nature and denatured God.
27. Regarding this foundation, prosecution of war crimes took place during the Ameri-
can Revolution, after the Spanish-American War and after the occupation of the Philip-
pines. After the Civil War, a landmark case was the trial of Confederate Major Henry Wirz
for his role in the death of several thousand Union prisoners in the Andersonville prison.
For discussions of these cases, including the Revolutionary War trial of Captain Nathan
Hale by a British military court and Major John Andre by a board of officers appointed by
George Washington. See Bassiouni, supra note 4, at 206-207. See also 8 AMERICAN STATE
TRIALS 657 (J. Lawson ed., 1917).
28. To a considerable extent, these crimes were made possible by U.S. betrayal.
Throughout the war, U.S. forces played an active role in encouraging Iraqi revolt against
Saddam Hussein's rule. Yet, when Iraqi. Shiites and Kurds heeded this encouragement, they
were left to their own devices; i.e., they were slaughtered with impunity. "The Iraqi people
alone have the responsibility and the right to choose their own government-without
outside interference," declared a Voice of America editorial on March 7, 1991, when Shiite
forces controlled almost all of southern Iraq. Bush administration policy, recalled Peter Gal-
braith, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staffer who visited Iraq in March, 1991, was
essentially as follows: "We're not going to get involved in Iraq's internal affairs." This was,
said Galbraith, "a clear signal to Saddam that he could kill whomever he needed to stay in
power." Tony Horwitz, After Heeding Calls To Turn On Saddam, Shiites Feel Betrayed,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 1991, at Al.
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in the conscience of humankind. International law now concedes that lim-
itations on the authoritative competence of each state are imposed not
only by the requirements of international comity, but also by the inher-
ent rights of each individual person to claims of life and dignity.29
International law does not sanctify sovereignty at all costs. Recogniz-
ing the peremptory character of a human rights regime, it has now trans-
ported a broad range of state-inflicted harms from the realm of domestic
jurisdiction to one of international concern. 0 Indeed, in the post-Nurem-
berg world order, international law has substantially enlarged the right of
particular states to intervene within the territory of other states, on be-
half of essential human rights.
The Charter of the United Nations, a multilateral, law-making
treaty, stipulates in its Preamble and several of its articles that interna-
tional law protects human rights. In the Preamble, the peoples of the
United Nations reaffirm their faith "in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
women and of nations large and small" and their determination "to pro-
mote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom."'3
These codified expressions of the international law of human rights,
29. These requirements of comity are normally associated with Emmerich de Vattel's
notion of "mutual aid." According to The Law of Nations, "[s]ince Nations are bound mutu-
ally to promote the society of the human race, they owe one another all the duties which the
safety and welfare of that society require." 3 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR
THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW xii (Charles G. Fenwick, trans., 1758). The core of Vattel's
argument for comity is as follows:
The end of the natural society established among men in general is that they
should mutually assist one another to advance their own perfection and that of
their condition; and Nations, too, since they may be regarded as so many free
persons living together in a state of nature, are bound mutually to advance this
human society. Hence the end of the great society established by nature among
all Nations is likewise that of mutual assistance in order to perfect themselves
and their condition. The first general law, which is to be found in the very end
of the society of Nations, is that each Nation should contribute as far as it can
to the happiness and advancement of other Nations.
Id.
30. These harms include crimes against the environment. For an exhaustive and au-
thoritative assessment of Iraqi crimes against the environment and their consequences, see
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY DIVISION, AMERICAN LAW DIVISION, 102D
CONG., 2 D SEsS., The Environmental Aftermath of the Gulf War (Comm. Print 1992). The
principal concerns of the Senate Gulf Pollution Task Force were: (1) the need to extinguish
the oil well fires as quickly as possible; (2) to examine potential health impacts on U.S.
troops and citizens of the region; (3) to examine the potential global and regional environ-
mental impact; and (4) to review the applicable principles of international law which gov-
erned Iraq's actions. Regarding the fourth concern, Iraqi crimes against the environment
and international law, the Task Force, inter alia, reaffirmed the fundamental principle of
responsibility for transnational harm. This principle is grounded in the expression of cus-
tomary international law that "a State is bound to prevent such use of its territory as, hav-
ing regard to the circumstances, is unduly injurious to the inhabitants of the neighboring
State." Id.-
31. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
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make abundantly clear that individual States can no longer claim sover-
eign immunity from responsibility for gross mistreatment of their own
citizens. Notwithstanding Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter, which reaffirms
certain areas of domestic jurisdiction, each State is obligated to uphold
basic human rights. Even the failure to ratify specific treaties or conven-
tions does not confer immunity from responsibility, since all States re-
main bound by the law of the Charter and by the customs and general
principles of law from which such agreements derive.
The international regime on human rights also establishes the con-
tinuing validity of natural law as the overriding basis of international law.
This establishment flows directly from the judgments at Nuremberg.3 2
While the Nuremberg Tribunal cast its indictments in terms of existing
positive law, law enacted by States, the actual decisions of the Tribunal
unambiguously reject the proposition that the validity of international
law depends upon its explicit and detailed codification.
Ironically, however, in the most recent case of egregious human
rights violation within a state, the genocide-like crimes committed by
Saddam Hussein against the Kurdish populations in Iraq, the legal com-
munity of humankind stopped short of authentic humanitarian interven-
tion. The fact that such intervention would have taken place in the after-
math of a UN sanctioned war of collective security and collective self-
defense against the regime in Baghdad compounds the irony of this fail-
ure. Indeed, the allies justified the war against Saddam on behalf of, inter
alia, the violation of human rights in Kuwait during the Iraqi occupation.
Why the contradiction? Why does such a glaring gap exist between
the settled tenets of international law and actual state practice? The an-
swer lies in geopolitics. Fearing a power vacuum in the region and the
alienation of U.S. allies, the Bush administration did not comply, in any
serious sense, with the Iraqi opposition.s3 The U.S. viewed the Iraqi Shi'a
opposing Saddam as pawns of Iran seeking to impose a Khomeini-style
regime, in spite of a very different history. The Iraqi Kurds were believed
32. See International Conference on Military Trials, Report of Robert H. Jackson, De-
partment of State, in BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, 1 DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION 368-369
(1975). The judgment of the International Military Tribunal of October 1, 1946 rested upon
the four Allied Powers' London Agreement of August 8, 1945, to which was annexed a Char-
ter establishing the Tribunal. Nineteen other states subsequently acceded to the Agreement.
33. In earlier cases, the unwillingness of the United States to support codified and well-
established anti-genocide norms derived from its obsessive commitment to anti-Sovietism.
Indeed, at the end of World War II, America shielded large numbers of Nazi war criminals
from prosecution, preferring to enlist their services as spies against East Germany and the
Soviet Union. At a time when the U.S. was involved as the principal architect of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, a secret military program-known aptly as "Rat-
line"-used Nazi war criminals as highly-paid intelligence agents against the East. All of
this took place when tens of thousands of concentration camp survivors were denied admit-
tance to the United States. See ABRAM L. SACHAR, THE REDEMPTION OF THE UNWANTED 129




to be seeking the complete breakup of Iraq and the creation of an inde-
pendent Kurdistan, an objective judged to be fundamentally dangerous to
our ally Turkey.
The failure of humanitarian intervention on behalf of Iraq's Kurds
dates back further than the end of the recent Gulf War. During the
1980's, this beleaguered population began a rebellion that was crushed
with extraordinary ferocity. Beginning in 1985, Saddam's regime engaged
in a systematic program of destruction of all of the villages of Kurdistan.
In March 1988, the regime used poison gas on the city of Halabja.
Later, Saddam launched a broad chemical attack on more than 70 villages
along the Iraqi-Turkish and Iraqi-Iranian borders. According to an au-
thoritative report offered by the Committee on Foreign Relations, United
States Senate: with that rebellion taking the lives of more than 100,000
Kurds and costing another two million of their homes, the Kurdish lead-
ership was reluctant to proceed without an assurance of success.3 4
Let us return to the matter of criminal prosecution. Where should
the trials be held? 5 Nuremberg had been expected to be the precursor for
the establishment of a permanent international criminal court for the
prosecution of international crimes. Yet, even today, no such court has
been created. Contrary to commonly held misconceptions, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice at the Hague has absolutely no penal or criminal
jurisdiction, and is therefore unsuitable for the task at hand.36
One obvious jurisdictional solution, would be to parallel Nuremberg
and establish a specially-constituted ad hoc Nuremberg-style tribunal
34. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 102d CONG., 1ST SESS., Civil War in
Iraq 2 (Comm. Print 1991).
35. After the Second World War, three judicial solutions were adapted to the problem
of determining the proper jurisdiction for trying Nazi offenses by the victim States, solu-
tions that were additional to the specially-constituted Nuremberg Tribunal. The first solu-
tion involved the creation of special courts set up expressly for the purpose at hand. This
solution was adopted in Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Holland, Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary and
Poland. The second solution, adopted in Great Britain, Australia, Canada, Greece and Italy,
involved the establishment of special military courts. The third solution brought the Nazis
and their collaborators before ordinary courts-a solution accepted in Norway, Denmark
and Yugoslavia. This solution was also adopted by Israel, although-strictly speaking-the
State of Israel did not exist at the time of the commission of the crimes in question.
36. The International Court of Justice does, however, have jurisdiction over disputes
concerning the interpretation and application of a number of specialized human rights con-
ventions. Such jurisdiction is accorded by the Genocide Convention, Dec. 9, 1948, art. 9, 78
U.N.T.S. 277; the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade
and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1056, art. 10, 266 U.N.T.S. 3; the
Convention on the Political Rights of Women, Mar. 31, 1953, art. 9, 193 U.N.T.S. 135; the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 38, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; and
the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Dec. 4, 1954, art. 14, A/Conf. 9/15, 1961,
annex. In exercising its jurisdiction, however, the ICJ must still confront significant difficul-
ties in bringing recalcitrant States into contentious proceedings. There is still no way to
effectively ensure the attendance of defendant States before the Court. Although many
States have acceded to the Optional Clause of the Statute of the ICJ, these accessions are
watered down by many attached reservations.
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within the defeated country's territory, (probably in Baghdad).3" Another
acceptable, and far more likely possibility would be to undertake such
proceedings within the country that had been Iraq's principal victim, Ku-
wait. The court could display broad coalition representation, if within
Iraq, or, depending upon the desired range of indictments, be fully
Kuwaiti in representation. The Convention on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Genocide,3 8 among other sources, would provide
legal precedent and justification for these possibilities. Article VI of this
Convention provides that trials for its violation be conducted "by a com-
petent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was commit-
ted, or by any such international penal tribunal as may have
jurisdiction." 9
37. Such a tribunal could be established under articles 22 and 29 of the United Nations
Charter, authorizing creation of subsidiary organs. See Luis Kutner & Ved P. Nanda, Draft
Indictment of Saddam Hussein, 20 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 91 (1991) (a very useful draft
indictment of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, his political, military and economic advisors,
and of other unnamed defendants).
38. This does not mean, however, that the creation of appropriate tribunals would be
contingent upon Iraqi crimes being authentic instances of genocide as defined at the Con-
vention. Rather, such creation would still be consistent with related "genocide-like" crimes
- crimes that may derive from multiple other sources of international law. See Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71
(1948); Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 606
U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force, April 22, 1954); Convention on the Political Rights of
Women, Mar. 31, 1953, 27 U.S.T. 1909, T.I.A.S. No. 8289, 193 U.N.T.S. 135, (entered into
force, July 7, 1976); Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples, Dec. 14, 1960, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66, U.N.
Doc. A/4684 (1961); International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966) (entered into
force, Jan. 4, 1969); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec.
16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967),
reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) (entered into force, Jan. 3, 1976); International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) (entered into force, Mar. 23, 1976); American Conven-
tion on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36 at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec.
OEA/Ser. L/V/II. 23 doc. 21 rev. 6 (1979), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) (entered into
force, July 18, 1978); The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (together with its Optional Protocol of 1976), the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Unrest, and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, known collectively as the International
Bill of Human Rights, serve as the touchstone for the normative protection of human rights.
39. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951). The Genocide Convention was
submitted to the Senate by President Harry S. Truman in June, 1949. On February 19,
1986, the Senate consented to ratification with the reservation that legislation be passed
that conforms U.S. law to the precise terms of the Treaty. This enabling legislation was
approved by Congress in October 1988, and signed by President Reagan on November 4,
1988. This legislation amends the U.S. Criminal Code to make genocide a Federal offense. It
also sets a maximum penalty of life imprisonment when death results from a criminal act
defined by the law. The Genocide Convention proscribes conduct that is juristically distinct
from other forms of prohibited wartime killing (i.e., killing involving acts constituting crimes
of war and crimes against humanity). Although crimes against humanity are linked to war-
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Washington and its allies must also decide on how broadly they wish
to prosecute Iraqi crimes. In this respect, the special post World War II
war crimes planning group had a somewhat easier task, focussing primar-
ily on particular Nazi groups defined as inherently criminal. Following
the recent defeat of Saddam Hussein, however, many of the crimes
against humanity committed by Iraq appeared unplanned and individu-
ally conceived. Consequently, coalition lists of suspected war criminals
could become so large as to prove altogether unusable. Alternatively, coa-
lition prosecution could focus essentially or even entirely on Saddam and
his leadership elite. This judicial strategy would permit many or all rank-
and-file Iraqi criminals to avoid punishment, but would at least stand
some chance of far-reaching and practical success.
Regarding breadth of prosecutorial concern, the United States and
its partners must also decide whether or not to include Iraq's crimes
against its own Kurdish populations. During 1987 and 1988, Baghdad un-
dertook a campaign of destruction of Kurdish villages, and the relocation
of large numbers of Kurds to selected areas of Iraq. In 1988, after the
Iran-Iraq war ended, the Iraqi air force launched massive chemical at-
tacks on Kurdish villages.
After the recent Gulf War, Iraq's Kurds were once again the targets
of genocidal assaults by Saddam Hussein's regime. In northern and
southern Iraq, forces loyal to Saddam Hussein shelled Kurdish cities in-
tensely, leveled entire neighborhoods and engaged in wholesale massacres
of Kurdish civilians. According to a report issued by the Committee on
Foreign Relations, United States Senate: "more than two million Iraqi
Kurds have sought refuge on the Iraq-Turkey and the Iraq-Iran borders
and they are dying at a rate of up to 2,000 a day."40 In the words of Peter
W. Galbraith, author of the report:
My visit to liberated Kurdistan, over the weekend of March 30-31,
coincided with the collapse of the Kurdish rebellion and the beginning
of the humanitarian catastrophe now overwhelming the Kurdish peo-
ple. I was an eyewitness to many of the atrocities being committed by
the Iraqi army, including the heavy shelling of cities, the use of phos-
phorous artillery shells, and the creation of tens of thousands of refu-
gees. From Kurdish leaders and refugees I heard firsthand accounts of
other horrors including mass executions and the levelling of large sec-
tions of Kurdish cities.41
These crimes continue well up to the present. At the time of this
writing, Iraq continues to launch large ground and air attacks against
Kurdish towns in northern Iraq. An unofficial cease-fire has remained in
time actions, the crime of genocide can be committed in peacetime or during a war. Accord-
ing to Article I of the Genocide Convention: "The contracting parties confirm that genocide,
whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law
which they undertake to prevent and to punish." Id.
40. Supra note 34, at vi.
41. Supra note 34, at v.
1993
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
effect. The entire pattern of Iraqi crimes against the Kurds goes beyond
domestic jurisdiction, and must be recognized as a matter of international
concern.
Finally, it should be noted that a coalition agency charged with creat-
ing "another Nuremberg" could adopt the solution favored by the United
States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France in 1945. The coalition
would establish a specially created tribunal for the trial of major
criminals while the domestic courts of individual coalition countries
would provide the venue for trials of "minor" criminals. As in the prose-
cution of Nazi offenses, the separation of major and minor criminals con-
cerns matters of rank or position, and would have nothing to do with the
seriousness or horror of particular transgressions.
From a strictly jurisprudential point of view, crimes of war, crimes
against peace and crimes against humanity are offenses against human-
kind over which there is universal jurisdiction and a universal obligation
to prosecute.4 However, the United States should now take the lead in
prosecution of major Iraqi criminals for many complementary reasons.
These reasons include the special U.S. role in military operations sup-
porting the pertinent Security Council resolutions, the historic U.S. role
at Nuremberg in 1945 and the long history of U.S. acceptance of jurisdic-
tional competence and responsibility on behalf of international law.4
42. The principle of universal jurisdiction is founded upon the presumption of solidar-
ity between states in the fight against crime. See generally HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF
WAR AND PEACE (Francis W. Kilsey trans., 1925), and EMMERICH DE VATrEL, LE DROIT DES
GENS, OU PRINCIPES DE LA Loi NATURELLE 93 (1916). The case for universal jurisdiction
(which is strengthened wherever extradition is difficult or impossible to obtain) is also built
into the four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, which unambiguously impose upon
the High Contracting Parties the obligation to punish certain grave breaches of their rules,
regardless of where the infraction was committed or the nationality of the authors of the
crimes. Cf. Art. 49 of Convention No. 1; Art. 50 of Convention No. 2; Art. 129 of Convention
No. 3; and Art. 146 of Convention No. 4. For further support of universality for certain
international crimes see M.C. BASSIOUNI, 2 INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW
AND PRACTICE (1987). See also RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402-404 and 443 (Tentative Draft No. 5, .1984); 18 U.S.C. § 3 (1992).
43. In addition to the territorial principle and the nationality principle, there are three
other traditionally recognized bases of jurisdiction under international law: the protective
principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the national interest injured by the of-
fense; the universality principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the custody of the
person committing the offense; and the passive personality principle, determining jurisdic-
tion by reference to the nationality of the person injured by the offense. The Genocide Con-
vention itself, however, does not stipulate universal jurisdiction. A recent example support-
ing the principle of universal jurisdiction in matters concerning genocide involves action by
the United States. A Ruling for the extradition to Israel of accused Nazi war criminal John
Demjanjuk, by the U.S. Court of Appeals in 1985, recognized the applicability of universal
jurisdiction for genocide, even though the crimes charged were committed against persons
who were not citizens of Israel and the State of Israel did not exist at the time the heinous
crimes were committed. In the words of the court:
"[w]hen proceeding on that jurisdictional premise neither the nationality of
the accused or the victim(s), nor the location of the crime is significant. The
underlying assumption is that the crimes are offenses against the law of na-
VOL. 21:2
IRAQI CRIMES
As noted by the Sixth Circuit in Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, "[t]he law
of the United States includes international law" and "international law
recognizes 'universal jurisdiction' over certain offenses.""" Article VI of
the Constitution, and a number of court decisions make all international
law, conventional and customary, the supreme law of the land. The Nu-
remberg Tribunal acknowledged that the participating powers "have done
together what any one of them might have done singly."4
In exercising its special responsibilities under international and mu-
nicipal law concerning prosecution of egregious Iraqi crimes, the United
States already has the competence to prosecute in its own federal district
courts.46 Pertinent authority for such jurisdiction can be found in sections
818 and 821 of Title 10 of the United States Code, which form part of an
tions or against humanity, and that the prosecuting nation is acting for all
nations.
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d. 571 (6th Cir. 1985).
44. Id. at 582-83. In all aspects of recent Iraqi crimes, jurisdiction to prosecute is unam-
biguously universal. Traditionally, piracy and slave trading were the only offenses warrant-
ing universal jurisdiction. Following World War II, however, states have generally recog-
nized an expansion of universal jurisdiction to include: crimes of war; crimes against peace;
crimes against humanity; hostage taking; crimes against internationally protected persons;
hijacking; sabotage of aircraft; torture; genocide; and apartheid. For the most part, this ju-
risdictional expansion has its origins in multilateral conventions, customary international
law and certain pertinent judicial decisions. The Second Circuit's statement in Filartiga v.
Pefha-Irala declares: "[tihe torturer has become, like the pirate and slave trader before him,
hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind." Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 890 (2d
Cir. 1980). The federal district court in United States v. Layton recognized that "nations
have begun to extend universal jurisdiction to.. .crimes considered in the modern era to be
as great a threat to the well-being of the international community as piracy." United States
v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 223 (N.D. Calif. 1981). For other judicial examples of assertions
of universal jurisdiction, see United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909 (D.C. 1988); Tel-Oren
v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984); and Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.C. 1985).
45. Apart from the prosecution of Nazi war criminals, there have been only two trials
under the Genocide Convention by competent tribunals of the States wherein the crimes
were committed: (1) in Equatorial Guinea, the tyrant Macis had been slaughtering his sub-
jects and pillaging his country for a number of years. He was ultimately overthrown, found
guilty of a number of crimes, including genocide, and executed. (In a report on the, trial,
however, the legal officer of the International Commission of Jurists concluded that Macis
had been wrongfully convicted of genocide); and (2) in Kampuchea, when the Khmer Rouge
were overthrown by the Vietnamese, the successor government instituted criminal proceed-
ings against the former Prime Minister, Pol Pot, and the Deputy Prime Minister on charges
of genocide, and the accused were found guilty of the crime, in absentia, by a people's revo-
lutionary tribunal.
46. Since its founding, the United States has reserved the right to enforce international
law within its own courts. The American Constitution confers on Congress the power "to
define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the
law of nations." U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10. Pursuant to this Constitutional prerogative,
the first Congress, in 1789, passed the Alien Tort Statute. This statute authorized United
States Federal Courts to hear those civil claims by aliens alleging acts committed "in viola-
tion of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States" when the alleged wrongdoers can
be found in the United States. At that time the particular target of this legislation was
piracy on the high seas.
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extraterritorial statutory scheme and 18 U.S.C. § 3231. It follows from all
this that international and U.S. law have already established the legal
machinery for bringing Saddam Hussein and his fellow criminals to jus-
tice. The only missing element is the political will to make this machinery
work.
However, we need to be realistic. Before international law can actu-
ally "work" in this matter, its agents will have to acquire custody of Sad-
dam Hussein et. al. Ideally, the coalition could obtain custody via the
long-established mechanisms of extradition"7 or prosecution, and the as-
sociated means of "indirect enforcement" (i.e., prosecution within author-
itative municipal courts in the absence of a permanently constituted in-
ternational criminal court or an ad hoc tribunal). But other possibilities
must be considered, as these prospects remain extremely remote.
One such possibility would involve the reinsertion of coalition mili-
tary forces into Iraq. Although the essential rationale of such return
would ensure Iraqi compliance with authoritative cease-fire expectations,
especially as they concern Baghdad's mandated elimination of weapons of
mass destruction, a reinserted multinational military force could also be
used to identify and apprehend alleged Iraqi criminals. Though entirely
proper from a jurisprudential perspective, reintroduction of appropriate
military forces for the sole purposes of such identification and apprehen-
sion, subject, of course to the limits4 of jus in bello or the laws of war,4 9
47. At this time, the United States has extradition agreements with over 100 countries.
The treaties range in age from an 1856 agreement with the Austrian Empire, which is still in
force with respect to one of its successor states (Hungary) to the protocol with Canada,
which entered into force in November, 1991. The Office of International Affairs in the Crim-
inal Division of the Department of Justice plays an important role in extradition matters.
From OIA's inception in 1979, its attorneys have cooperated with the Department of State
in negotiating all new extradition agreements. According to testimony by Robert Mueller,
III, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice:
In general, our goal in extradition negotiations in recent years has been three-
fold: first, to expand the number of offenses for which extradition can be ob-
tained by including all conduct that is criminal under the laws of both coun-
tries and punishable by a specified minimum period of incarceration; second,
to limit the exceptions to extradition, particularly the exception for so-called
political offenses; and third, to improve the way in which extradition treaties
function by simplifying and clarifying provisions that were inadequately ad-
dressed in older treaties.
Consular Conventions, Extradition Treaties and Treaties Relating to Mutual Legal Assis-
tance in Criminal Matters (MLATS); Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992)(Statement by Robert S. Mueller, III).
48. See 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO NATU-
RAL LAW 139 (Frank Gardner Moore, trans., 1964) (for an early expression of limits under
the law of war).
As for the force employed in war against the enemy and his property, we
should distinguish between what an enemy can suffer without injustice, and
what we cannot bring to bear against him, without violating humanity. For he
who has declared himself our enemy, inasmuch as this involves the express
threat to bring the worst of evils upon us, by that very act, so far as in him lies,
gives us a free hand against himself, without restriction. Humanity, however,
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would be unlikely for both tactical and political reasons.
Another possibility would involve custody by forcible abduction.5 0
commands that, so far as the clash of arms permits, we do not inflict more
mischief upon the enemy than defense, or the vindication of our right, and
security for the future, require.
Id.
49. The principle of proportionality, of course, has its origins in the biblical Lex Ta-
lionis, (law of exact retaliation). The "eye for eye, tooth for tooth" expression is found in
three separate passages of the Jewish Torah, or biblical Pentateuch. These Torah rules are
likely related to the Code of Hammurabi (c. 1728-1686 B.C.)-the first written evidence for
penalizing wrongdoing with exact retaliation. In matters concerning personal injury, the
code prescribes and eye for an eye (#196), breaking bone for bone (#197), and extracting
tooth for tooth (#199). Among the ancient Hebrews, we should speak not of the lex talionis,
but of several. The lex talionis appears in only three passages of the Torah. In their se-
quence of probable antiquity, they are as follows: Exodus 21:22-25; Deuteronomy 19:19-21;
and Leviticus 24:17-21. (All have affinities to other Near Eastern codes.) These three
passages address specific concerns: hurting a pregnant woman, perjury, and guarding
Yahweh's altar against defilement. See MARVIN HENBERG, RErRIBUTION: EVIL FOR EVIL IN
ETHICS, LAW AND LITERATURE 59-186 (1990). In contemporary international law, the princi-
ple of proportionality can be found in the traditional view that a state offended by another
state's use of force, if the offending state refuses to make amends, "is then entitled to take
'proportionate' reprisals." INGRID DETTER DE LupIs, THE LAW OF WAR 75 (1987). Evidence
of the rule of proportionality can also be found in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights of 1966, supra note 38, at art. 4. Similarly, the American Convention on
Human Rights, supra note 38, allows at Article 27(1) such derogations in "time of war,
public danger or other emergency which threaten the independence of security of a party"
on condition of proportionality. In essence, the military principle of proportionality requires
that the amount of destruction permitted must be proportionate to the importance of the
objective. In contrast, the political principle of proportionality states that "a war cannot be
just unless the evil that can reasonably be expected to ensue from the war is less than the
evil that can reasonably be expected to ensue if the war is not fought." DOUGLAS P. LACKEY,
THE ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE 40 (1989).
50. Regarding custody by abduction, two discrete issues present themselves: (1) seizure
of hostes humani generis (common enemy of mankind) when custody cannot be obtained
via extradition; and (2) seizure of hostes humani generis who is a sitting head of state. On
the first issue, we may consider that President Reagan, in 1986, authorized procedures for
the forcible abduction of suspected terrorists from other states for trial in U.S. courts. John
Walcott, Andy Pasztor & David Rogers, Reagan Ruling to Let CIA Kidnap Terrorists Over-
seas is Disclosed, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 1987, sec. 1, at 1, col. 6. The statutory authority for
President Reagan's posture, however, was contingent upon the terrorist acts being involved
with taking U.S. citizens hostage-acts that are subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts
under the Act on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking 18 U.S.C.
§ 1203 (1992). In 1987, in international waters, the F.B.I. lured a Lebanese national named
Fawaz Younis onto a yacht and transported him by force to the U.S. for trial. His abduction
was based upon his suspected involvement in a 1985 hijacking of a Jordanian airliner at
Beirut airport in which U.S. nationals had been held hostage. G. Gregory Schuetz, Appre-
hending Terrorists Overseas Under United States and International Law: A Case Study of
the Fawaz Younis Arrest, 29 HARV. INT'L L. J. 499, 501 (1988). On the second issue, we may
recall that under international law, there is normally a very substantial difference between
abduction of a terrorist or other hostes humani generis and abduction of any head of state.
Indeed, there is almost always a presumption of sovereign immunity, a binding rule that
exempts each state and its high officials from the judicial jurisdiction of another state. Al-
though the rule of sovereign immunity is certainly not absolute in the post-Nuremberg
world order, the right of one state to seize a high official from another state is exceedingly
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Under international law, there normally exists a very substantial differ-
ence between abduction of an ordinary criminal or even an hostes
humani generis, common enemy of mankind, and abduction of a sitting
head of state. Indeed, a presumption of sovereign immunity, a rule that
exempts each state and its high officials from the judicial jurisdiction of
another state or transnational authority, persists.5 '
What if neither of these possibilities prove practical? Here interna-
tional law may have to content itself with conducting trials in absentia.
According to the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annexed
to the London Agreement of August 8, 1945:
the Tribunal shall have the right to take proceedings against a person
charged with crimes set out in Article 6 of this Charter (crimes of war;
crimes against peace and crimes against humanity) in his absence, if
he has not been found or if the Tribunal, for any reason, finds it nec-
essary, in the interests of justice, to conduct the hearing in his
absence.5"
Yet, trials in absentia would not be without serious difficulties.53
Apart from their intrinsic shortcomings, such trials may still run counter
to long-settled principles of justice and due process in national and inter-
national law. In the UN Report of the 1953 Committee on International
limited. In an 1812 case before the Supreme Court of the United States, The Schooner
Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812), Chief Justice Marshall went even further, argu-
ing for "the exemption of the person of the sovereign from arrest or detention within a
foreign territory." Nevertheless, where the alleged crimes in question are of a Nuremberg-
category and no other means exist whereby to gain custody of the pertinent head of state,
the expectations of nullum crimen sine poena (no crime without punishment) may override
those of sovereign immunity. In the United States, the terms of the Posse Comitatus Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1385 (1992), prohibit the U.S. military from undertaking domestic law enforce-
ment. However, this prohibition does not apply outside the United States. See John
Quigley, Enforcement of Human Rights in U.S. Courts: The Trial of Persons Kidnapped
Abroad, in WORLD JUSTICE? U.S. COURTS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 59-80 (Mark
Gibney ed., 1991). It would appear, therefore, that the United States has authority under its
own and international law to gain custody of Saddam Hussein, et. al., by forcible abduction
if necessary. This argument is all the more compelling in view of U.S. seizure of General
Manuel Noriega, whom Washington regarded as a head of state, from Panama in 1990.
Noriega, it should be recalled, had been charged with violations of U.S. drug trafficking
laws, norms substantially less serious than those revolving around Nuremberg-category
crimes.
51. Historically, the rule of sovereign immunity may be traced to Roman Law and to
the maxim of English Law that the King can do no wrong. Under current United States law,
the authoritative expression of this rule may be found in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1992).
52. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
53. Regarding in absentia trials, Professor D'Amato, responding to a question by Sena-
tor Charles S. Robb at the Hearing on The Persian Gulf and The Question of War Crimes,
argued that "there is more psychological impact in having a standing indictment against
[Saddam Hussein], hanging over his head, maybe not a 'Sword of Damocles,' but a 'Sword
of Justice.'" See D'Amato, supra note 10, at 19.
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Criminal Jurisdiction, the Committee reaffirmed the general principle of
law that an accused "should have the right to be present at all stages of
the proceedings."5 4 In the Annex to this Report, in the Committee's Re-
vised Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, the rights of the
accused to a "fair trial" include, inter alia, "the right to be present at all
stages of the proceedings." 55
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on November 4, 1950, also stipu-
lates that everyone charged with a criminal offense has the right, "to de-
fend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choos-
ing. . . ."" The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which entered into.force in 1976 affirms this right.
5 7
Strictly speaking, however, when a tribunal charges someone with a
criminal offense and offers them representation through legal assistance
of his own choosing, as an alternative to defending himself in person, this
opportunity satisfies essential minimum guarantees under law and does
not deprive the individual of due process. Similarly, anyone who is
charged with a criminal offense and offered but declines the opportunity
to defend himself in person, is normally not being mistreated under law.
Finally, though distasteful, assassination may be.considered as a very
last resort in the matter of Saddam Hussein et. al. Notwithstanding the
normal prohibitions of assassination under international law, especially as
they pertain to a head of state, circumstances exist wherein the expecta-
tions of the anti-genocide regime must override the ordinary prohibi-
tions.58 After all, if the assassination of a Hitler or a Pol Pot could have
saved millions of innocent people from torture and murder, wouldn't jus-
tice have required its application?
From the point of view of international law, assassination as a rem-
edy for Iraqi genocide and genocide-like crimes would be least problem-
atic if it originated within Iraq. Such action would qualify under the right
of tyrannicide. Aristotle, Plutarch and Cicero offer traditional and au-
thoritative support for such a form of assassination. According to Cicero:
[T]here can be no such thing as fellowship with tyrants, nothing but
bitter feud is possible: and it is not repugnant to nature to despoil, if
you can, those whom it is a virtue to kill; nay, this pestilent and god-
less brood should be utterly banished from human society. For as we
54. Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, Aug. 20, 1953,
U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/2645 (1954).
55. Revised Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, Annex to the Report of
the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, Id.
56. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
57. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 38.
58. Under United States law, "[p]rohibition on Assassination. No person employed by,
or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage
in, assassination." 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1993).
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amputate a limb in which the blood and the vital spirit have ceased to
circulate because it injures the rest of the body, so monsters, who
under human guise, conceal the cruelty and ferocity of a wild beast,
should be severed from the common body of humanity."'
What if the assassination remedy originated outside Iraq? Could
such action be construed as an example of law-enforcement, or would it
necessarily be criminal behavior? The answer to this question depends,
inter alia, upon the presence or absence of a condition of war between the
states involved. When a condition of war exists between states, interna-
tional law normally views transnational assassination as a war crime. Ac-
cording to Article 23(b) of the regulations annexed to Hague Convention
IV of October 18, 1907, respecting the laws and customs of war on land,
"it is especially forbidden... to kill or wound treacherously, individuals
belonging to the hostile nation or army." 0 U.S. Army Field Manual 27-
10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1956), has incorporated the Hague prohi-
bition, in Paragraph 31: "this article 4s construed as prohibiting assassina-
tion, proscription or outlawry of an enemy, or putting a price upon an
enemy's head, as well as offering a reward for an enemy dead or alive."61
Whether or not a particular state has followed a comparable form of in-
corporation, it is bound by the Hague regulations entered into customary
international law as of 1939, according to the 1945 Nuremburg tribunal.
However, a contrary argument exists. Some maintain that the law
should consider enemy officials, operating within the military chain of
command, as combatants and not enemies hors de combat! This reason-
ing, widely accepted with reference to the assassination of Saddam Hus-
sein during the 1991 Gulf War, views certain enemy officials as lawful
targets, and assassination of enemy leaders as permissible. This contrary
59. Elsewhere, Cicero, citing approvingly to the Greeks, offers further support for
tyrannicide:
Grecian nations give the honors of the gods to those men who have slain ty-
rants. What have I not seen at Athens? What in the other cities of Greece?
What divine honors have I not seen paid to such men? What odes, what songs
have I not heard in their praise? They are almost consecrated to immortality
in the memories and worship of men. And will you not only abstain from con-
ferring any honors on the savior of so great a people, and the avenger of such
enormous wickedness, but will you even allow him to be borne off for punish-
ment? He would confess-I say, if he had done it, he would confess with a high
and willing spirit that he had done it for the sake of the general liberty; a thing
which would certainly deserve not only to be confessed by him, but even to be
boasted of.
This is taken from Cicero's speech in defense of Titus Annius Milo, a speech offered on
behalf of an instance of alleged tyrannicide committed by Milo, leader of Lanuvium. Cicero,
The Speech of M. T. Cicero In Defense of Titus Annius Milo, in SELECT ORATIONS OF M.T.
CICERO 208 (C.D. Yonge trans., 1872).
60. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with Annex of Reg-
ulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910) [herein-
after Laws and Customs of War on Land].
61. U.S. ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 27-10 (1956).
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argument, in practice, has simply ignored the position codified at Article
23(b) of Hague Convention IV.
In principle, adherents of the assassination of enemy officials in war-
time could offer two possible bases of jurisprudential support: (1) such
assassination does not evidence behavior designed "to kill or wound
treacherously"' 2 as defined at Hague Article 23(b); and/or (2) a "higher"
or jus cogens obligation allows assassination in particular circumstances
that transcends and overrides pertinent treaty prohibitions. To argue the
first position would focus primarily on a "linguistic" solution; to argue the
second would propose a return to the historic natural law origins of inter-
national law.
Where no state of war exists, international law would normally define
assassination as the crime of aggression and/or terrorism. Article 1 of the
Resolution on the Definition of Aggression defines aggression as: "the use
of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsis-
tent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this
Definition.
63
In view of the jus cogens norm of non-intervention codified in the
UN Charter, ordinarily violated by transnational assassination, such kill-
ing would generally qualify as aggression. Moreover, assuming that trans-
national assassination constitutes an example of "armed force," Article 2
of the Definition of Aggression may criminalize such activity as
aggression:
the first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter
shall constitute prima facia evidence of an act of aggression although
the Security Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude
that a determination that an act of aggression has been committed
would not be justified in the light of other relevant circumstances." '
In the absence of belligerency, assassination of officials in one state
upon the orders of another state might also be considered as terrorism.
Normally considered a convention on terrorism, the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents' particular prohibitions of assassi-
nation are also relevant here. After defining 'internationally protected
person,' at Article 1, Article 2(a) of the convention identifies as a crime,
inter alia, "the intentional commission of (a) a murder, kidnapping or
other attack upon the person or liberty of an internationally protected
person. '66
62. Laws and Customs of War on Land, supra note 60.
63. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, Adopted by the U.N. General Assem-
bly, Dec. 14, 1974, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1975).
64. Id.
65. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
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The European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism rein-
forces the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons. Article 1(c) of this Convention
considers any "serious offense involving an attack against the life, physi-
cal integrity or liberty of internationally protected persons, including dip-
lomatic agents as one of the constituent crimes of terror violence. Article
1(e) considers "an offense involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket,
automatic firearm or letter or parcel bomb if this use endangers persons"
another constituent terrorist crime.
6 6
These arguments notwithstanding, circumstances exist wherein the
expectations of the authoritative human rights regime must override the
ordinary prohibitions against transnational assassination, both the
prohibitions concerning conditions of peace and conditions of war. The
most apparent of such circumstances, such as the present case of Saddam
Hussein, involve genocide and related crimes against humanity.7 Al-
Protected Persons, Dec. 14, 1973, art. 1, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532 (entered into
force Feb. 20, 1977).
- 66. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, art. 1, Jan. 27, 1977, Europ.
T.S. 90.
67. The utilitarian view is that human actions should be evaluated in light of their
consequences, and that only this consequentialist approach will enable us to deal with com-
plex moral and legal issues in a rational, clear, objective and precise fashion. The principle
of utility, which has its origins with Jeremy Bentham, is "that principle which approves or
disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have
to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question . . .to pro-
mote or to oppose that happiness." Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of
Morals and Legislation, in PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 125 (W. Harrison ed.,
1979). A good utility-based argument against those who claim that assassination is imper-
missible because it arouses antipathy is Bentham's statement against the principle of sym-
pathy and antipathy which
approves or disapproves of certain actions, not on account of their tending to
augment the happiness of the party whose interest is in question, but merely
because a man finds himself disposed to approve or disapprove of them: hold-
ing up that approbation or disapprobation as a sufficient reason for itself, and
disclaiming the necessity of looking out for any extrinsic ground.
Id. at 138-139. Also, says Bentham:
If we could consider an offence which has been committed as an isolated fact,
the like of which would never recur, punishment would be useless. It would
only be adding one evil to another. But when we consider that an unpunished
crime leaves the path of crime open, not only to the same delinquent, but also
to all those who may have the same motives and opportunities for entering
upon it, we perceive that the punishment inflicted on the individual becomes a
source of security to all. That punishment which, considered in itself, appeared
base and repugnant to all generous sentiments, is elevated to the first rank of
benefits, when it is regarded not as an act of wrath or of vengeance against a
guilty or unfortunate individual who has given way to mischievous inclinations,
but as an indispensable sacrifice to the common safety.
1 JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW: THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 396 (J.
Bowring ed., 1962). From the utilitarian point of view, only consequences constitute good
reason for punishing or abstaining from punishment; desert and justice do not count in their
own right. Punishment is an evil which a utilitarian considers morally justified only when it
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though the argument promoting assassination must normally rest on the
presumption that leaving Saddam alive would assuredly result in addi-
tional Nuremberg-category crimes, further destruction of dissident popu-
lations within Iraq and/or additional crimes of war, against peace and
against humanity, such an argument may also stand solely on the juris-
prudential requirement of punishment."9 In this retributive view, 9 law
enforcement rationale for the assassination of Saddam Hussein would lie
not only in the preemption of new crimes but also in the literal claims of
nullum crimen sine poena.
Exactly how ancient is the principle of nullum crimen sine poena,
"no crime without a punishment"? The earliest statement of nullum cri-
men sine poena can be found in the Code of Hammurabi (c. 1728-1686
B.C.), the Laws of Eshnunna (c. 2000 B.C.), the even-earlier code of Ur-
Nammu (c. 2100 B.C.) and, of course, the lex talionis, or law of exact
retaliation, presented in three separate passages of the Jewish Torah, or
biblical Pentateuch.7 0 At Nuremberg, the words used by the Court, "so
far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his wrong
were allowed to go unpunished," represented a reaffirmation of this
principle."
The Hebrews viewed the shedding of blood as an abomination that
is a means for securing a greater good. Because of the principle of nullum crimen sine
poena, this is a principle not always accepted by utilitarians. This is the case because there
are occasions, from a utilitarian perspective, where punishment is judged inappropriate.
Where punishment would have worse consequences than non-punishment, punishment
would be unprofitable and declined. According to utilitarian thought, every unprofitable
punishment is ipso facto morally unjustified. Or as Bentham puts it: "It is cruel to expose
even the guilty to useless sufferings." JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 345 (R.
Hildreth ed,. E. Dumont trans., 1871).
68. The permissibility of assassination here is contingent upon the underlying theory of
punishment. Where one holds to a utilitarian view, assassination would not be justified un-
less it were judged to prevent further harm. A retributive view of punishment, however,
could justify assassination even without expected deterrent benefits because injustice should
not be allowed with impunity.
69. A classical supporter of "retributive justice" was Immanuel Kant. Writing in Phi-
losophy of Law, Kant identifies the mode and measure of punishment as follows: "[t]his is
the right of retaliation (justalionis), and properly understood, it is the only principle which
in regulating a public court... can definitely assign both the quality and the quantity of a
just penalty." Immanuel Kant, Public Right, in Philosophy of Law (Hastie trans., 1887). On
the retributive view generally, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 91-139
(1978); SIR WALTER MOBERLY, THE ETHICS OF PUNISHMENT 96-120 (1968); C. L. TEN, CRIME,
GUILT, AND PUNISHMENT 38-65 (1987); ROBERT NOZlCK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 363-97
(1981); JOHN KLEINIG, PUNISHMENT AND DESERT (1973); D. J. GALLIGAN, The Return to Ret-
ribution in Penal Theory, in CRIME, PROOF AND PUNISHMENT 154-157 (C. Tapper ed., 1981);
IGOR PRIMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 67-110 (1989); TED HONDERICH, PUNISH-
MENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 22-51 (1969); A TEXTBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 320-326
(G. Paton and Durham eds., 1964); HEINRICH OPPENHEIMER, THE RATIONALE OF PUNISHMENT
(1975); MARY MARGARET MACKENZIE, PLATO ON PUNISHMENT 21-33 (1981). For a broader but
fascinating treatment, see also HENBERG, supra note 49.
70. See supra note 49.
71. For the court statement, see A. P. D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW 110 (1964).
1993
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
required expiation, "for blood pollutes the land, and no expiation can be
made for the land, for the blood that is shed in it, except by the blood of
him who shed it." '2 This ancient Hebrew belief in "pollution" parallels
that of the ancient Greeks. In the words of Marvin Henberg: "The
(Greek) Erinyes do for the Greeks of the seventh to fourth centuries
B.C.E. what Yahweh does for the ancient Hebrews, they demand the
blood of homicides."" The pre-Socratic philosophers, especially Anaxi-
mander, Heraclitus and Parmenides, displayed a metaphysical view of re-
tributive justice as inherent in the cosmos itself.74 Among the ancient
Greeks, homicide pollution extended to those guilty of accidental murder
and, left unpunished, even threatened the community at large. According
to Marvin Henberg:
Homicide pollution entails the following: One guilty of murder, delib-
erate or accidental, contracts a metaphysical stain, invisible save to
the Erinyes and to the gods. Like a deadly disease, pollution renders
the agent a danger to others, for until the stain is purified or the pol-
luted person exiled the public at large stands threatened. Crops may
be blighted (witness Oedipus Rex) as incentive for the populace to
seek out the murderer. Liability to suffering, then, is collective; and in
its nearly allied form of the curse, pollution can be hereditary as well
as collective, visiting each generation of a single family with renewed
suffering. Finally, the doctrine of pollution imposes strict liability for
its offenses. No excuse, justification or mitigation of penalty is al-
lowed: The accidental manslayer must seek purification equally with
one who kills out of greed or passion.75
Aeschylus gives a good sense of the Greek view of punishment. In
The Libation-Bearers (310-14) the chorus intones: "the spirit of Right
cries out aloud and extracts atonement due: blood stroke for the stroke of
blood shall be paid. Who acts, shall endure. So speaks the voice of the
age-old wisdom. 78
Plato included himself among those who recognize the duty of pun-
ishment. Thinking of vice, the source of crime, as an ailment of the soul,
just as physical disease to the body, he recommends punishment to re-
store order in the soul. The criminal, therefore, derives a positive benefit
72. Numbers 35:33. For a contemporary expression of the "blood for blood" conception
of punishment, see statement of U.S. Senator, now Vice-President, Al Gore on the fourth
anniversary of the gassing of the Kurdish city of Halabja. Offered to the U.S. Senate on
March 18, 1992, Gore called for establishment of a formal war crimes tribunal to prosecute
Saddam Hussein for "cruel, inhuman, unthinkable repression." In justifying such a tribunal,
Gore said it would "perform a sacred duty to the dead whose blood, as the Bible says, cries
out from the earth on which it was spilled." Mass Killings in Iraq, Hearings Before the
Comm. On Foreign Relations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 51 (1992).
73. See HENBERG, supra note 49, at 77.
74. WERNER JAEGER, 1 PAIDEIA: THE IDEALS OF GREEK CULTURE 150-169 (Gilbert Highet
trans., 1945); Gregory Vlastos, Solonian Justice, in 41 CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY 65 (1946); and
HUGH LLOYD-JONES, THE JUSTICE OF ZEUS 80-81 (1971).
75. See HENBERG, supra note 49, at 79.
76. AESCHYLUS, THE LIBATION - BEARERS, 310-314.
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from punishment. Discarding the claims of retributivism, Plato views
punishment as just and good only to the extent that it serves the common
good by advancing human welfare. Punishment should turn others from
vice and teach virtue. Aristotle, Cicero, St. Thomas Aquinas, Hobbes, and
Bentham have taken similar positions. Says Bentham:
The general object which all laws have, or ought to have, in common,
is to augment the total happiness of the community; and therefore in
the first place, to exclude, as far as may be, everything that tends to
subtract from that happiness; in other words, to exclude mischief....
But all punishment is mischief; all punishment in itself is evil. Upon
the principle utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it ought to be
admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil. 7
It follows that utilitarian views of punishment, in contrast to retribu-
tivist perspectives, may or may not support the principle of nullum cri-
men sine poena. As to retributivist perspectives, the philosopher Kant
remains the classic example of this view of legal punishment, but here
retributive justice has nothing to do with revenge. Kantian retribution, an
action of the state against the criminal, is an impersonal action, under-
taken without passion, and as a sacred duty. Kant views legal punishment
of criminals as a distinct categorical imperative. In Kant, we see the
strongest possible reaffirmation of nullum crimen sine poena:
Even if a civil society were to dissolve itself by common agreement of
all its members (for example, if the people inhabiting an island de-
cided to separate and disperse themselves around the world), the last
murderer remaining in prison must first be executed, so that everyone
will duly receive what his actions are worth and so that the blood-
guilt thereof will not be fixed on the people because they failed to
insist on carrying out the punishment; for if they fail to do so, they
may be regarded as accomplices in this public violation of legal
justice.7 8
Kant returns to the beginning, to the concept of "blood-guilt," and to
the insistence that society has a duty to punish even without resulting
utilitarian consequences..
At the Nuremberg Trial, which concluded with an explicit reaffirma-
tion of nullum crimen sine poena, the Court based its sentencing not on
reformation, not deterrence, but on retribution. In the words of Sir Wal-
ter Moberly, "the principle really embodied at Nuremberg was the princi-
ple of retribution. At the time of the trial public opinion in the victorious
countries undoubtedly demanded and acclaimed it. Rightly or wrongly,
public opinion saw punishment as not only allowable and expedient, but
an imperative duty. '" This instance of retributive justice, undertaken be-
77. Bentham, supra note 66, at 170.
78. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Element of Justice, in THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS. 102 (John Ladd trans., 1965).
79. MOBERLY, supra note 68 at 103.
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cause the malefactors so clearly deserved punishment, also served to en-
sure that, henceforth, the most abominable perpetrators of international
crimes could reasonably expect enforcement of the principle, nullum cri-
men sine poena. This precedent makes the prosecution of Saddam Hus-
sein for Nuremberg-category crimes an indisputable jurisprudential
expectation.
President Clinton has no time to lose. Facing a world described pro-
phetically by the poet Yeats, a world wherein "the blood-dimmed tide is
loosed, and everywhere/The ceremony of innocence is drowned;/The best
lack all conviction, while the worst/Are full of passionate intensity,"80 the
new American leader can choose to stand for naked geopolitics or for jus-
tice. Should he choose the latter, as indeed he must, this country would
again be aligned with essential principles of dignity and lawfulness.
Should he opt for geopolitics, as would happen if he decided against pros-
ecution of Iraqi crimes, we would have no choice but to agree that "there
is no longer a virtuous nation, and the best of us live by candle light.""1
80. VATTEL, supra note 29, at 135. It is instructive to recall Vattel's argument on the
observance of justice between nations:
Justice is the foundation of all social life and the secure bond of all civil inter-
course. Human society, instead of being an interchange of friendly assistance,
would be no more than a vast system of robbery if no respect were shown for
the virtue which gives to each his own. Its observance is even more necessary
between Nations than between individuals, because injustice between Nations
may be followed by the terrible consequences involved in an affray between
powerful political bodies, and because it is more difficult to obtain re-
dress. . . .[a]n intentional act of injustice is certainly an injury. A Nation has,
therefore, the right to punish it. . . . The right to resist injustice is derived
from the right of self-protection.
Id.
81. W. B. YEATS, THE LETTERS OF W. B. YEATS 691 (Allan Wade ed., 1954).
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